



The Antwerp Declaration
for a European Industrial Deal

Antwerp Declaration Monitoring Report

Executive summary

Deloitte.

Executive summary

83%

Competitiveness KPIs monitored for the EU showing no improvement or even deterioration

14%

Competitiveness KPIs benchmarked internationally demonstrating a very clear advantage for the EU

- 
EU industrial users continue to face persistently high energy prices: In 2025, the gas price went up with 13% and the electricity price plateaued. Compared to other regions, the EU gas price is 4.6 times higher than the US and the electricity price is 2.4 higher than China, the US and India.
- 
The EU is expanding clean energy capacity but is outpaced by China and its PPA market remains small: China now has 2.4 times the EU's clean energy capacity and is further accelerating, deploying clean power at 5 times the EU's rate. Cumulative EU PPA volumes represent only 6.4% of total clean energy capacity.
- 
The EU struggles to deploy infrastructure at the required pace: Despite increased grid investment, at par with the US but lagging China, the EU did not make significant progress on interconnectivity. Besides, connection queues, up to twice the waiting time in the US, are a clear bottleneck. The EU remains distant from CCS and H2 targets.
- 
EU regulatory landscape is an increased barrier to investment and significant time is spent on compliance: The proportion of EU firms identifying business regulation as a major barrier to investment has increased by 42% over the past three years. Senior staff dedicated to compliance is 1.5 times more vs the US and 11 times more vs China.
- 
Funding shortfalls and complexity limit EU industrial transition: Member States provide 75% of public funding, yet distribution remains uneven. Structural EU-level funding gaps, illustrated by the Innovation Fund which is five times oversubscribed, are further exacerbated by a complex and fragmented funding architecture.
- 
Demand-side levers for low-carbon and Made in Europe products remain underutilized despite significant potential: While public procurement accounts for 14% of the EU's GDP, there is no EU-wide mandatory green public procurement and a lack of harmonization of data and standards.
- 
The EU remains structurally constrained by persistent raw material dependencies and limited domestic production: The EU is fully import-dependent for more than half of critical raw materials. The EU leads with a circular material use rate of 12%, well above the global average, yet is faced with increased plastic recycling facility closures.
- 
Improving the Single Market could significantly increase overall EU competitiveness: Internal market barriers impose costs equivalent to tariffs of approximately 65% for goods and up to 100% for services. 61% of EU manufacturing exporters have reported compliance with varying standards and rules across Member States.
- 
The EU's innovation framework lags the US and China: Overall innovation performance ranks 20 percentage points lower than China, and 15 percentage points lower than the US. Deficiencies include a higher risk premium, significantly lower patent filings & venture capital activity, and inefficiencies in R&D spending despite individual successes among Member States.
- 
The EU's trade strategy has expanded beyond traditional tariff and barrier removal: The proportion of EU trade benefiting from preferential terms has grown with 29%. The number of EU trade defence cases, mainly concerning anti-dumping measures, has doubled over the past five years.

Evolution of EU performance year-over-year (1/2)



Pillar 2
Public funding

- 2.1 EU & Member States funding for climate-focused industrial projects
- 2.2 Innovation Fund oversubscription rate

Pillar 3
Energy

- 3.1 Industry electricity and gas prices (with price component breakdown)
- 3.2 New clean energy capacity by source (renewable and nuclear)
- 3.3 Industry volume of power purchase agreements (PPAs)

Pillar 4
Infrastructure

- 4.1 Investment in power grid infrastructure and storage as share of GDP
- 4.2 Share of member states reaching electricity interconnectivity target
- 4.3 Key infrastructure projects (IPCEI & CEF) total funding in energy, digital, CCUS, and recycling
- 4.4 Digital infrastructure
- 4.5 Total CO₂ mineral storage and injection capacity
- 4.6 Manufacturing occupations labour shortage

Pillar 5
Raw materials

- 5.1 External Vulnerability Index (EXVI)
- 5.2 Domestic Production Index
- 5.3 Biomass flows going into bioenergy and biomaterials
- 5.4 Circular Material Use Rate (CMUR)

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
			+ +	=	- -	
	- -	+ +	+ +	- -	+ +	
	+ +	- -	- -	=	+ +	=
	=	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +	
	+ +	+ +	-	+ +	+ +	- -
	=		+ +		+ +	
		=	-	+ +	=	-
	+ +	=	+ +	-	=	
	=	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +
	=	=	=	=	=	=
	+ +	- -	-	=	+ +	=
				=		
		-	=	=		
	=	=	+ +	=	- -	
	=	=	=	=	=	

← Prev **1** 2 Next →

Note: Analysis based on best data available. Additional details on the evolution can be found in appendix B.

- Worse than last year's performance
- - Significantly worse than last year's performance
- = Neutral or equal to last year's performance
- No data available
- + Better than last year's performance
- + + Significantly better than last year's performance







Evolution of EU performance year-over-year (2/2)



		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Pillar 6 Boost sustainable demand	6.1 Public procurement contracts using sustainability-related criteria				=	=	=
	6.2 Export markets access through Preferential Trade Agreements	=	=	=	=	=	
	6.3 Consumer incentives and demand mandates driving markets for net-zero, low-carbon and circular products	=	=	=	=	=	
Pillar 7 Single Market	7.1 Trade between Member States (as share of EU GDP)	=	=	+ +	=	=	
	7.2 Intra-EU trade of waste and recycled materials	=	+	=	=	=	
	7.3 Internal market barriers costs					-	
Pillar 8 Innovation	8.1 Cost of capital	+	=	- -	+	=	
	8.2 Patent applications and commercialisation rate for the industry	=	=	=	=	=	
	8.3 EU and Member States budget allocations for research & innovation (R&I)	=	=	=	=	=	
	8.4 Venture capital investment by stages (early, breakout, scale-up) and by key industrial segments	+	+ +	- -	- -	-	=
	8.5 Operational regulatory sandboxes				+		+ +
Pillar 9 Regulation	9.1 Cost of administrative burden						=
	9.2 Business regulations as an obstacle to firms	=	=	=	=	- -	=
	9.3 Permitting time for key industrial projects		=	=	=	=	=

← Prev 1 **2** Next →

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International benchmark (1/2)

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Pillar 5 Raw materials

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- 5.2 Domestic Production Index
- 5.3 Biomass flows going into bioenergy and biomaterials
- 5.4 Circular Material Use Rate (CMUR)

	EU	US	China	India	GCC
2.1 EU & Member States funding for climate-focused industrial projects	+	-	+	-	+
2.2 Innovation Fund oversubscription rate					
3.1 Industry electricity and gas prices (with price component breakdown)	- -	+ +	+	+	+ +
3.2 New clean energy capacity by source (renewable and nuclear)	+	=	+ +	=	-
3.3 Industry volume of power purchase agreements (PPAs)					
4.1 Investment in power grid infrastructure and storage as share of GDP	+	+	+ +	+ +	=
4.2 Share of member states reaching electricity interconnectivity target					
4.3 Key infrastructure projects (IPCEI & CEF) total funding in energy, digital, CCUS, and recycling					
4.4 Digital infrastructure	=	+ +	+		
4.5 Total CO ₂ mineral storage and injection capacity	-	+ +	+	- -	+
4.6 Manufacturing occupations labour shortage	+	-			
5.1 External Vulnerability Index (EXVI)	=	-	+		
5.2 Domestic Production Index	-	-	+ +	- -	- -
5.3 Biomass flows going into bioenergy and biomaterials	+ +	-	+	=	- -
5.4 Circular Material Use Rate (CMUR)	+ +	-	=	=	-

← Prev **1** 2 Next →

Note: Analysis based on best data and most recent year available. Additional details on the comparison can be found in appendix B.

○ Evolution of EU performance year-over-year

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International benchmark (2/2)

Pillar 6
Boost sustainable demand

- 6.1 Public procurement contracts using sustainability-related criteria
- 6.2 Export markets access through Preferential Trade Agreements
- 6.3 Consumer incentives and demand mandates driving markets for net-zero, low-carbon and circular products

Pillar 7
Single Market

- 7.1 Trade between Member States (as share of EU GDP)
- 7.2 Intra-EU trade of waste and recycled materials
- 7.3 Internal market barriers costs

Pillar 8
Innovation

- 8.1 Cost of capital
- 8.2 Patent applications and commercialisation rate for the industry
- 8.3 EU and Member States budget allocations for research & innovation (R&I)
- 8.4 Venture capital investment by stages (early, breakout, scale-up) and by key industrial segments
- 8.5 Operational regulatory sandboxes

Pillar 9
Regulation

- 9.1 Cost of administrative burden
- 9.2 Business regulations as an obstacle to firms
- 9.3 Permitting time for key industrial projects

	EU	US	China	India	GCC
6.1	+	+	=	-	-
6.2					
6.3	+	+	=	-	-
7.1	-	=	=		
7.2					
7.3					
8.1	=	+	-	+	
8.2	-	=	+ +	- -	- -
8.3	=	=			
8.4	- -	+ +	-	- -	- -
8.5	+ +	- -	+ +	- -	- -
9.1	-	+	+ +	-	-
9.2	-	+	+ +	- -	+
9.3	-	+	+	+	+

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
- + Better than average international performance
- + + Significantly better than average international performance

○ Evolution of EU performance year-over-year

EU industrial energy prices remain significantly elevated, substantially higher than key global markets


Gas prices for EU industrial users increased by 13% in 2025, now 4.6 times higher than in the US

Industrial gas price across regions in EUR/MWh (2019-2025)



Electricity prices in the EU stagnated in 2025, remaining 2.4 times higher than in China, the US, and India

Industrial electricity price across regions in EUR/MWh (2019-2025)




Source: Deloitte, based on Eurostat, 2025; EIA, 2025; NDRC, 2025; ICED, 2025

EU is expanding clean energy capacity but is outpaced by China and its PPA market remains small

In 2024, China's expansion in renewables grew 5 times more than in the EU, doubling the EU's total clean capacity


Total clean capacity by region in GW (2015-2024)



Source: IRENA, 2025

EU PPA volumes dropped 35% in 2025 and remain half the size of the US market, representing just 6.4% of clean energy capacity


Total PPA volumes in the EU in GW (2015-2025)



Source: WindEurope, 2025

Energy & supply costs remains the biggest cost driver in the EU. Taxes are highest in the EU at 15%, compared to 13% in the US and 5% in China

Industrial electricity price breakdown by component in EUR/MWh: EU, US, and China




Source: Deloitte, based on Eurostat, 2024; EIA, 2025; China Briefing, 2025

EU grid investment rises, but limited connectivity and long queues hinder progress


Despite investing 0.46% of GDP in power grid and storage only 14 of 27 EU Member States met the 15% electricity interconnectivity target

Investment on power grid and storage as share of GDP (2015-2024)



Source: Deloitte, based on IEA 2024; World Energy Investment 2024 & 2025 Reports, License: CC BY 4.0.


Number of Member States that have reached 15% interconnectivity electricity target (2021-2025)



Source: European Commission, 2025

Long connection queues, with waiting times averaging 7 to 10 years limit industrial electrification and clean energy deployment in the EU


Grid connection speed: Median duration in the US in years (2000-2023) and EU current average (2023/25)



Source: Deloitte, based on Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2024 and Ember, 2025.

With just 0.6 Mtpa of operational CO₂ storage, the EU is far behind the 50 Mtpa 2030 target and global peers, highlighting an urgent need to de-risk the entire CCS value chain

Operational CO₂ storage capacity (Mtpa) by storage type and region in 2025




Source: Deloitte analysis, based on Global CCS Institute, 2025; Clean Air Taskforce, 2024

While digital infrastructure has improved, the EU struggles to deploy it at the required pace


EU semiconductor market share stuck at 10%, significantly trailing the US, with major initiatives aiming to double to 20% by 2030

EU semiconductors global market share (%)



Source: Deloitte analysis; based on European Commission (Digital Decade reports), 2025


Semiconductors global market share by company HQ in 2025 (%)



Source: SIA, 2025


Strong node growth indicates progress, but the EU remains behind the US and China in AI data centre capacity

Number of edge computing nodes providing latencies below 20 milliseconds in the EU



Source: Deloitte; based on European Commission (Digital Decade reports), 2025

Installed data centre capacity in GW per region in 2025




Source: VisualCapitalist, 2025

EU regulatory landscape is perceived as an increased barrier to investment and significant senior leadership time is spent on compliance

EU senior staff spend 11 times more time on compliance than China and 1.5 times more time than the US


Share of time spent by senior staff on regulatory compliance



Source: WBES, 2025

EU firms citing regulation as a major investment barrier rose 42% in four years, well above US levels


Share of firms identifying business regulation as a major obstacle




Source: EIBIS, 2025

Although EU-specific climate funding increased year on year, total funding, including Member States, dropped by 39% in 2024 due to a temporary budget freeze in Germany, and remains unevenly distributed

EU & Member States funding for projects related to climate objectives in billion EUR



Total funding per Member State in 2021-2024 in billion EUR



Source: Deloitte analysis based on European Commission, 2025

The Innovation Fund oversubscription rate of 513% highlights a structural funding gap, exacerbated by the EU's overall complex and fragmented funding architecture

Innovation Fund oversubscription rate in % and requested vs. available budget in billion EUR




Source: Deloitte analysis based on European Commission, 2025

Demand-side levers for low-carbon, net zero and circular products, such as consumer incentives, remain underutilized despite significant potential

EU Member States have 4 times more environmental consumer incentives than the US, boosting demand for decarbonisation products, while unintentionally strengthening China’s industrial exports and supply chain dependencies

Number of environmental consumer incentives per Member State and US State (cumulative up until 2024)




Source: OECD, 2025

The EU remains structurally constrained by persistent limited domestic production and critical raw material dependencies. Conversely, it outperforms global benchmarks in circularity although progress is too slow to reach EU targets

The EU has relatively limited domestic production capacity compared with China's dominant share


Total CRM domestic production by country/region (Mt) (2020-2023)



Source: British Geological Survey, 2025 & Deloitte analysis, 2025

EU leads circularity with 12% circular material use rate, well above a global share of secondary materials of 7%. Progress is however too slow to meet the 2030 target


Evolution of CMUR (%) in the EU



Source: Eurostat, 2025 and Deloitte analysis

Despite significant internal market barriers and a recent decline between 2022 and 2024, trade between Member States has grown by 41% from 2014 to 2024, highlighting strong economic interdependence among Member States

Share of EU GDP represented by trade between Member States (%)




Source: Eurostat, 2026; World Bank Group, 2025; Deloitte analysis, 2025

EU lags behind the US and China on patent filings and on overall innovation performance index


China dominates the patent landscape, filing 17 times more applications than the EU and 3 times more than the US

Evolution of the total number of patent direct applications and PCT applications per region between 2015 and 2024



The overall innovation performance of the EU average is 14.6 percentage points lower than the US, although strong differences between Member States have been observed

Summary of the innovation index in 2024 and 2025 (relative to EU in 2018) (%)




Source: WIPO Statistics Database

Source: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, 2025

The EU's trade strategy has evolved significantly in recent years, expanding beyond traditional tariff and barrier removal to include broader preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that also prioritise supply chain resilience

The coverage of PTAs has increased by 29% since 2019, with over half of EU exports now destined for preferential markets.


PTA Coverage - Share of EU's exports to PTA markets vs world



Source: Deloitte analysis; based on UN Comtrade, 2025

Since 2021, the number of EU trade defence cases in said categories doubled, mostly concerning anti-dumping measures.

Initiation of EU Trade defence cases between 2017 and 2025, including anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures



Source: Cefic, 2026; Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, 2026